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Introduction 
Although European external trade policy is the issue area par excellence in which the European 
Union enjoys exclusive competence to negotiate agreements on behalf of the member states, 
member state preferences are nevertheless highly consequential for policy outcomes in this 
domain. Not only are the member states, through the Council of Ministers, able to supply the 
Commission with negotiating directives (better known as ‘mandates’), they also have to ratify 
the eventual agreement the Commission has reached. Therefore, even in such a ‘European’ 
domain as external trade, the study of member state preferences is indispensible to arrive at 
solid explanations of European policies. This paper will therefore focus on member state 
preferences on trade as the dependent variable, irrespective of the eventual outcomes (policies 
and positions) at the European level. 
 One approach to explaining differences in preferences among EU member states is to 
introduce dimensions that serve as a basis for differentiating between groups of member states 
which are expected to have different preferences. Common dimensions that are assumed to be 
consequential for trade policy preferences are the North-South (liberal/protectionist) and Left-
Right (protectionist/liberal) dimensions. Although these relatively crude dimensions go a long 
way to explain overarching general variation in trade preferences among EU member states, 
they cannot explain the whole story. Not only is it easy to list numerous exceptions to these 
general rules, but applying such dimensions at the state level also leaves the researcher unable 
to explain intra-state variation. In other words, it does not explain why a state pursues 
liberalization in one sector and protectionism in another. 
 This dimensions-approach therefore needs to be complemented in order to be able to 
arrive at convincing explanations of state preferences on trade. This paper seeks to offer a 
contribution in two ways. First, it descends from aiming at a theory of a single national 
preference to focusing on the aggregation of the national preference from the preferences held 
by different domestic actors. To this end I introduce a new dimension on the basis of which EU 
member states can be distinguished, namely domestic structure.  This dimension does not 
enable direct indications of the content of the state’s trade preferences, but it allows 
hypotheses on the kind of domestic actors that are important in the preference-formation 
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process,  and whose ideas and preferences may therefore be expected to be decisive. 
Explaining which actors are important is one thing, but this does not in itself explain the 
national preference that is the outcome of the domestic process of preference aggregation. My 
second contribution therefore focuses on the origins of/ explanation of the preferences of the 
domestic actors. While common explanations of trade preferences of such actors usually 
exclusively focus on their economic interests (based on the factors of production for example), 
this paper argues that ideational interests - based on the state identity or the policy paradigm 
underlying trade policy - should also be taken into account. These ideational variables may 
differ with respect to different trade sectors and therefore provide explanation of the variation 
in trade policy preferences in separate economic sectors in a single state. 
 In the remainder of this paper, I will first define what ‘preferences’ are (the 
conceptualization that is used in this paper) and whether and how they can be measured. I will 
then move on to explain the commonly theorized effects of North-South and Left-Right 
dimensions on national trade preferences. After introducing the theoretical framework on the 
aggregation of national preferences, the different hypotheses will subsequently be tested in the 
cases of French and German preference formation on the GATT Uruguay Round (1986-1993). 
These cases do not only vary with respect to their domestic structure (France having a 
government-dominated and Germany a society-dominated domestic structure), they also 
provide variation on the North-South (Germany-France) and the Left-Right (France 1988-March 
1993/ France 1986-1988, 1993 and Germany 1986-1993) dimensions. The case analysis should 
therefore give insights in the effects of all the dimensions introduced above and on how a 
state’s ideational interests interact with these dimensions. 
 
Conceptualizing and measuring Preferences 
A preference is a ranking of different possible outcomes. In this sense it is often compared to 
the ranking of terminal nodes of a game tree (Frieden, 1999: 43). When an actor ranks the 
different potential outcomes of an interaction process (on foreign economic policy for 
example), then this ranking constitutes its foreign economic policy preference. The discussion in 
the literature on preferences does not primarily focus on its definition, but particularly on 
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whether they should be treated as exogenous or endogenous (rational-choice versus 
constructivist approaches for example) and on whether and how preferences can be measured 
in empirical research (cf. Frieden, 1999). 
 Measuring national preferences in empirical research is often considered problematic. 
Frieden (1999) argues that preferences cannot be observed directly through an actor’s 
behavior, because government statements on policy positions for example do not only include 
the government’s preference, but also its strategy of attaining that preference. Since the 
former is difficult to distinguish from the latter in empirical observations, preferences 
themselves are difficult to observe. 
 Strictly speaking, the claim that it is difficult to distill genuine motivations from what an 
actor communicates in speeches and writings is absolutely warranted. Nevertheless, in 
conducting empirical research on national preferences, a certain degree of pragmatism is 
required in order to be able to perform empirical research on preferences altogether. 
Furthermore, ‘strategy’ can be interpreted in two distinct ways, only one of which is actually 
problematic when it comes to measuring preferences. 
 One interpretation is that considering a state’s preference for wealth, one strategy of 
achieving this goal can be free trade.  
 
                         Strategy                                                                         Preference 
                        Free trade                                                                           Wealth 
 
When the terms preference and strategy are applied in this way, it does not have adverse 
consequences for empirical research. The strategy in this example in turn constitutes a choice 
from a range of alternative strategies – by the same token one could argue that protectionism 
is a more economically advantageous option for certain types of states – for creating wealth, 
and can thus in itself be treated as a preference. At yet another level, free trade itself may be 
considered a preference which can be pursued through different strategies (bilateral 
agreements versus multilateral agreements for example), over which actors may hold a certain 
preference. Usage of the terminology of preferences and strategies therefore depends on the 
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(framing of the) issue under investigation and, if used consistently, does not in itself pose a 
problem for the empirical observation of preferences. The first interpretation of the distinction 
between preferences and strategies rather serves an analytical purpose which could also be 
reached by applying different sets of labels: such preferences as opposed to policy preferences, 
or preferences over outcomes as opposed preferences over means (refs, bv Van Esch). 
 
                         Strategy                                                                         Preference 
                         Policy Preference                                                              Preference 
                         Preference over means                                                   Preference over ends 
 
                        Free trade                                                                           Wealth 
 
 Another interpretation of the difference between preference and strategy may be more 
problematic however. This is the idea that a state can have a certain preference, but that in 
stating its position at the international level, it also takes its environment into consideration 
(the perception of its power, the expected reactions of other actors in the negotiating process 
etcetera). Government statements can therefore not be taken at face value, but include both a 
state’s preference and its strategy to reach the desired outcome in an undistinguishable 
manner. Take the following example: 
 
Strategy Preference 
Demanding 50% reduction in agricultural 
tariffs, anticipating opposition and the need to 
compromise 
Reducing agricultural tariffs by 30% 
 
 Here the observation of the governmental statement on its position would make the 
researcher induce a state preference of 50% reductions, while in fact, the government would 
prefer 30%. The observation indeed does not indicate the genuine preference. Nevertheless, in 
this example the adverse consequences for the empirical results remain limited, because in 
both cases the researcher would rightfully induce that the state prefers trade liberalization 
through tariff cuts. The difference between real preference and the behavior-induced-
measurement of the state preference is one in degree (the magnitude of the tariff cuts). 
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 If we take the following example, however, it becomes clear that the second 
type/interpretation of difference between strategy and preference can also be very 
consequential. 
 
Strategy Preference 
Assuming that a majority for quota will be 
unattainable and a position in favour of such 
quota would reduce the chances of a majority 
for variable import levies as opposed to export 
subsidies, the actor decides to defend the 
position that variable import levies should be 
introduced 
Protectionism through import quota > variable 
import levies > export subsidies 
 
If one took the government’s position statement at face value in this case, the empirical 
research would not uncover the genuine national preference. In empirical research on national 
preferences, this problem cannot be solved entirely, but usage of different types of documents 
(internal governmental documents for example) complemented with interviews with important 
actors in the decision making process can limit its adverse effects to some extent. 
 Apart from measuring preferences by means of empirical observation, preferences can 
also be specified by assumption or deduction (Frieden, 1999: 53). Realist and liberal 
institutionalist assumptions about a state’s interest in survival to be achieved through the 
maximization of national power are exemplary of the former. Although such an assumption can 
rightfully be criticized for being imprecise (Weldes, 1996), some kind of assumption of an 
exogenous interest or prior preference is simply indispensible if one aims to explain and predict 
or deduce preferences instead of merely measuring them by empirical observation.  
This can be illustrated by how preferences are deduced in international political 
economy. Common in this approach is the claim that the more competitive a certain firm is, the 
more it will favour free trade. In aggregating national preferences, researchers therefore 
analyze important national firms and their competitiveness, in order to arrive at a national 
preference. To this end – moving from the individual firm level to the national level – they 
eventually also need a theory of aggregation, but what is important here, is that trade 
preferences of firms are deduced on the basis of characteristics of these actors, and these 
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deduced preferences are the input in further analysis. The deduction of the firm’s trade 
preference could not be performed, however, without the prior exogenous preference for 
maximum profits (to be achieved through international trade). In the words of Frieden 
(1999:61): ‘Something is always exogenous. The choice is this: how far back do we push our 
search for theoretically based preferences?’  
In this paper I use the term preference both for preferences over means and 
preferences over ends and will combine assumption, deduction and empirical observation in 
order to arrive at and test a theoretical framework explaining national trade preferences. 
 
Explaining trade preferences 
 
Assumption 
I assume that states aim for maintaining or strengthening their power position. Although it is 
usually assumed that trade particularly affects a state’s economic power and welfare, and that 
in forming a preference over a set of potential behavioural alternatives a state will rank these 
alternatives according to the economic costs and benefits it attaches to them, I would argue 
that ideational considerations also affect trade preferences. States are interested in acting in 
accordance with their identity and existing economic paradigms and will also reflect on the 
commensurability of potential behavioural options with the incentives arising from these 
ideational variables. Adding this ideational component results in a more complex analysis, 
because the identity concepts and economic paradigm against which potential behavioural 
options have to be evaluated first need to be established empirically. In the introduction of the 
case studies, I will therefore analyze the relevant French and German identity concepts and 
economic ideas. [nb: mate van staatsinterventie hierbij, overlapt nogal met l/r dimensie bij de 
deductie; maar daar is het als iets beschouwd dat voor alles in de staat geldt, terwijl het 
mogelijk ook per beleidsterrein kan verschillen] 
 
Deduction 
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The North-South and Left-Right distinctions I referred to earlier are essentially characteristics of 
the actor on the basis of which trade preferences are deduced. Both dimensions emphasize 
cleavages at the state level which are expected to have predictable consequences for national 
trade policy preferences. Northern EU member states, which are overall the wealthier member 
states, are expected to be more free trade oriented and supportive of market-based solutions, 
while the less wealthy, Southern member states are considered to be more protectionist, 
preferring regulatory over market-based solutions (Thomson et al., 2004). Within the EU, the 
United Kingdom, the Netherlands, Sweden, Denmark and Germany are considered typical 
‘Northern’ states, whereas Portugal, Italy, Greece, Spain and France are classified ‘Southern’. 
On the basis of this dimension, one would therefore expect that the overall rate of protection 
or preferences for protectionist measures will be higher in the Southern than in the Northern 
states. What this dimension does not explain is intra-state variation in trade preferences, either 
in different periods or with respect to different sectors. 
 The Left-Right dimension –  still a variable at the national level with direct consequences 
for national preferences – can explain variation in the degree of intra-state protectionism in 
different periods (classified on the basis of turnover in government) and in different sectors 
provided that these sectoral differences coincide with the temporal differences. In other words: 
in cannot account for variation in preferences in different sectors in a single time period.  The 
Left-Right dimension is a socio-economic dimension, where left-wing governments are 
expected to be more favourable towards regulatory intervention and support government 
spending to induce economic growth, whereas right-wing governments are considered to be 
more favourably disposed towards market-based solutions and support lower government 
spending, balanced budgets and lower inflation (Thomson et al., 2004; Milner and Judkins, 
2004). As a result, left-wing governments are expected to be more protectionist than right-wing 
governments. Although with respect to the associated preference for either regulatory or 
market-based solutions, the North-South and Left-Right dimensions coincide, an important 
advantage of the latter over the former is the variation it allows within states in different 
periods. 
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 While North-South differences are relatively uncontested, the consequences of 
partisanship for trade preferences are questioned. Hiscox (2002) for example argues that 
political parties are unlikely to compete on trade, as every party is likely to represent multiple 
interest groups with different trade preferences and is thus unlikely to arrive at a coherent 
position. Others (Rogowski, 1989; Milner and Judkins, 2004), to the contrary, claim that left-
wing parties are more representative of labour and will thus be more inclined to support 
protectionist measures, while right-wing parties are more representative of capital and will 
push for free trade. Although Milner and Judkins provide a theoretically convincing argument, 
empirical reality does not always agree. If we take the agricultural sector as a case in point, this 
dimension is unable to explain why the Christian Democrats and Liberal Party in Germany are 
far more favourably disposed towards protectionism in agricultural trade than the Social 
Democrats, while in France nearly all the parties from left to right support agricultural 
protectionism. Socio-economic variables are clearly not decisive here. 
 A third characteristic concerns economic sectors within the state: these are expected to 
be more favourably disposed towards free trade when they are more competitive 
internationally (ref). We therefore deduce that competitive industries will demand free trade, 
whereas uncompetitive industries will demand protectionist measures. It is important to note 
that the deduced preferences are the preferences of individual sectors or industries and cannot 
be equaled with national preferences. A theory of aggregation is needed in order to arrive at 
expectations on the impact of different domestic actors in the process that results in the 
national preference that is defended by the government in European or international 
negotiations. The variable of domestic structure (another dimension on which the European 
member states can be classified) enables the formulation of hypothesis on the expected 
influence of different actors in the national preference-formation process. 
 
Domestic structure and the aggregation of national preferences 
 
By domestic structure, I mean the structural power relations within the state between 
government and societal actors. To the extent that these relations are more government-
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dominated, the capability of the government to impose its will on other domestic actors (or 
pursue policies against the will of these actors) increases (Van der Vleuten, 2001: 39; McGrory 
Klyza and Mlyn, 1995). With respect to the aggregation of the preferences of different domestic 
actors into the national preference, this implies that the preferences of governmental actors 
will carry a greater weight than those of societal actors such as economic lobby groups. This 
does not mean that societal groups hold now influence whatsoever, but ‘societal opposition 
can be ignored at least until it reaches very high levels’ (Skidmore and Hudson, 1993: 8-9). I 
expect that in this case the ideational convictions of the government based on the state identity 
and laid down in governmental paradigms, are most likely to impact on the national 
preferences defended in the international arena. It is important to note in this respect (see also 
below) that the content of these ideational variables may partially coincide over various 
sectors, but often also differ between these sectors, potentially resulting in different sectoral 
trade preferences. 
 With respect to the direct linkage with trade policy preferences, in a simple model one 
could argue that a stronger power position for governmental actors is more likely to result in 
free-trade policies, whereas power relations favouring societal actors will lead to more 
protectionist policies. This would be the case under the assumption that societal actors are 
generally less free-trade oriented and more protectionist than governmental actors (ref.). 
Although this could be a general correlation in a large-N study, case studies show neither that 
the bulk of societal actors demands protectionist policies, nor that governmental actors are 
always favourably disposed towards trade liberalization. What I would expect though, is that 
the hypothesis based on the Left/Right dimension is more likely to hold in states with 
government-dominated domestic structures, than in states with society-dominated ones. This 
would be a logical consequence of the relative power of the government and the expectation 
that the national preference in that case will particularly reflect governmental preferences. 
Since the Left/Right dimension is expected to impact on precisely these governmental 
preferences, the related hypotheses on a state’s national trade preference is most likely to hold 
in government- dominated states. 
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 When a state’s domestic structure is more society-dominated, the preferences of 
societal actors will have a greater impact on national preferences. The influence of a particular 
societal actor then depends on how well it is organized and the extent to which it has 
(institutionalized) access to the government (Alons, 2010). Moravcsik assumes that the 
government will serve as a transmission belt particularly for powerful economic interest groups 
(Moravcsik, 1998). Although it is indeed these actors that usually enjoy the greatest 
organizational strength (membership, degree of mobilization), one should not underestimate 
the influence of political parties either. The government’s ideational considerations may still 
have an important impact on the national preference under society-dominated domestic 
structures as well, to the extent that these ideas are shared by or resonate well with the ideas 
held by societal actors. 
 What remains to be done then, is to provide a measurement for the domestic structure, 
which can be applied to different European member states. The degree of economic integration 
is a first indicator, defined as ‘the coordinated, co-operative, and systematic management of 
the national economy by the state, centralized unions and employers’ (Siaroff 1999: 177). A 
larger degree of economic integration is assumed to be favourable for the power position of 
societal actors in their relations with governmental actors (Nordlinger, 1981: Tsebelis, 1995). A 
pluralist economy, lacking systematic coordination and cooperation between governmental and 
societal actors, on the other hand, reflects a more government-dominated state structure (see 
also Van Waarden, 1992). While Siaroff’s scores indicate that Germany enjoys a high degree of 
economic integration, France has a very pluralist economy. 
 A second indicator of domestic structure is the degree to which power is centralized 
within the government. The larger the degree of centralization, the more government-
dominated a state’s domestic structure. France is a unitary state where executive power is 
mainly concentrated in the hands of the President and the Prime Minister (cf. Kessler 1999: 
Lijphart 1999). Only during periods of cohabitation between a President of one party and a 
government with different party affiliations, is the degree of centralization somewhat reduced. 
During the case under research in this paper, a socialist President had to govern with a centre-
right government between 1986 and 1988 and after March 1993. Nevertheless, compared to 
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the German federal state with a low degree of centralization, the relative concentration of 
executive power remains high in France in the entire period under study. 
 The third indicator of domestic structure is the relationship between the executive and 
the legislative, or the degree to which parliament constitutes a veto player. These relations 
contribute to a state-dominated domestic structure, when the government has a secure 
majority support in parliament and when the legislature does not hold extensive powers. The 
French legislature does not hold extensive powers (Tsebelis, 1995), but between 1988 and 
March 1993, the socialist government was a minority government, resulting in an overall 
executive-legislative balance. Before 1988 and after 1993, the relations were executive-
dominated. The German parliament wields far more extensive powers than its French 
counterpart. In addition, the German government only held a stable majority in the upper 
chamber until 1989 (Rudzio, 2003: 328). Executive-legislative relations were thus balanced in 
Germany until 1989, after which they were legislative-dominated.  
 
Table 1. French and German domestic structure 
 France Germany 
Measure of  ‘economic 
integration’ 
pluralist High level of economic 
integration  
Centralization high/ intermediate low 
Executive-legislative executive-
dominated/executive-
legislative balance 
executive-legislative balance/ 
society-dominated 
Domestic structure government-dominated society-dominated 
 
Taking together the French and German scores on the three indicators, we may conclude that 
the French domestic structure is more government-dominated, whereas the German is more 
society-dominated. On the basis of these differences I expect that in the domestic process of 
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preference aggregation, societal actors will be more influential in Germany than in France. Also, 
the ideational considerations of the government are expected to have a greater impact on the 
national preferences in France than in Germany, unless the relevant ideas on which these 
considerations are based in Germany resonate well with societal ideas on the matter. When the 
latter is the case, ideational considerations will increase in importance in Germany as well. 
Furthermore, considering the influence of the Left/Right dimension, I expect that its impact will 
be greater in the French case than in the German case. 
The different theoretical approaches introduced in this paper, can be summarized in the 
following conceptual models. 
 
North/South                                                                                                Trade preference 
 
Left/Right                                                                                                     Trade preference               
 
 
      Domestic Structure 
 
 
Competitiveness                          Governmental economic  
Economic sectors                           Considerations                                             
 
                                                         Governmental ideational 
                                                         Considerations                                           National Preference 
 
Competitiveness 
Economic sectors                           Societal Preferences  
 
 
 
                                                                                                Domestic Structure 
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Case selection 
As noted in the introduction, I selected French and German preference formation on the 
Uruguay Round of GATT-negotiations as the cases to be studied in this paper, because this 
selections provides variation on the North/South dimension, the Left/Right dimension and on 
the variable of domestic structure which is essential in the alternative model I proposed. As the 
Uruguay Round included negotiations on trade liberalization in a number of different sectors, 
and because both a state’s competitiveness and the content of relevant ideational variables 
may differ per sector, I chose to single out two specific sectors, the inclusion of which in the 
Uruguay Round had either been attempted earlier without success or had not been the subject 
of GATT negotiations before: agriculture and services. 
In the presentation of the French and German cases on these two issues, I will first 
elaborate on the relevant French and German ideas reflected in aspects of their state identities 
and governmental paradigms with respect to both issue [+ in welke mate gedeeld door societal 
actors]. Next, I will establish the competitiveness of the two sectors in France and Germany, 
followed by an analysis of the preferences of relevant German and French interest groups and 
the demands they made on their governments. Finally, I will turn to the process in which the 
government aggregated the national preference that it subsequently defended in the 
international arena. While doing this, I will attempt to uncover on the basis of internal 
governmental documents, the national preference as precisely as possible in order to 
distinguish it from potential strategies that may have influenced the position the state actually 
defended internationally. 
 
France and the liberalization of agricultural trade 
 
French identity and governmental paradigm 
The ideational considerations of the French government are related to the match between the 
political programme of the government and its underlying principles, as well as the behavioural 
incentives arising from the state’s identity on the one hand, and the principles that underlie as 
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well as the content of the policies establishing the different behavioural alternatives on the 
other hand. 
 France is known for its high degree of state intervention in the market. Marie-Christine 
Kessler speaks of a ‘disposotif d’intervention’ and ‘idéologie interventionniste’ in this respect 
(1999: 284-285). Van Esch emphasizes that French ideas on economic policy prioritize the goals 
of improving the French competitive position and protecting French producers against 
international competition, attained by the policy instruments of modernization, nationalization 
and trade restrictions (2007: 143). State intervention is particularly direct and comprehensive in 
the agricultural sector (Coulomb et  al , 1990: 24-25). Agriculture is considered an affaire d’État 
for reasons of food storage and supply and because the state was considered responsible for 
distributing the right to farm the land and determining what farmers should provide for the 
state in return. With respect to the latter, the principle emerged in the 1970s and 1980s that 
agriculture should also serve social purposes related to the preservation of the countryside. 
Apart from nature conservation, this included preserving agriculture as a traditional way of life 
and preventing a rural exodus (Gyomarch et al, 1998: 156). This ‘multifunctionality’ was not 
only a justification for state intervention in agriculture, it was also a goal in itself. Concerning 
the method of intervention, the principle of market organization through price policy is central 
in the French agricultural policy paradigm (Tubiana, 1990: 135). 
 When it comes to the French vision of itself and its role in the world  - impinging on 
what it means to be French and thus constituting aspects of the French identity – France 
ascribes itself a vocation exportatrice in the agricultural sector, considers itself to be ‘la Grande 
nation’ leading Europe, while sharing a special friendship with Germany (l’amitié privilégiée). 
The first aspect specifically relates to the agricultural sector, where France considers the export 
of agricultural products a ‘vocation’ (Fouilleux, 1996: 52). It is France’s role in the world to 
provide the world with superior quality French agricultural products and secure French 
presence in the export market. The French vision of taking a powerful and independent place in 
the world is often combined with fierce resistance to American hegemony (Kessler, 1999: 153; 
Cogan, 2003: x). President Mitterrand argued in this respect that ‘a United European power led 
by the French had potential to develop into a third superpower, foster peace and prosperity, 
16 
 
and safeguard French independence’ (Van Esch, 2007: 279). Finally, France considers itself a 
friend of Germany and places high value on this friendship. Originally the French regarded it 
imperative ‘to tie Germany into European integration by any means possible, and not to allow it 
to become an independent power’ (Haywood, 1993: 278-279). Notwithstanding these 
geopolitical motivations for the Franco-German friendship, it is also an ideational factor that 
‘has become deeply embedded institutionally’ over time (Cogan, 2003: 99). 
 When we compare the government’s view on agriculture with that of the French farm 
lobby, the level of similarity is striking. The FNSEA (Fédération Nationale des Syndicats 
d’Exploitants Agricoles) both stressed the objective of providing food for the people 
(L’information Agricole, May 1983) and its vocation exportatrice (L’Information Agricole, May 
1989; October 1989).  Furthermore, in accordance with the government’s idea of the 
multifunctionality of agriculture, the FNSEA also endorsed the idea that farmers should 
populate the rural territory, manage the countryside and protect the environment 
(L’information Agricole, December 1988; May 1989). Compared to the government, the farm 
organizations did however place a greater emphasis on agriculture as an economic activity in 
which farm income should, for the greater part, be generated from the marketing of 
agricultural produce (L’information Agricole, January 1987). On the one hand, this dovetailed 
with the government’s focus on intervention through price policy, but the government’s 
increasing emphasis on multifunctionality, on the other hand, also increased the risk of 
remuneration or support that was not clearly matched by genuine labour on the part of the 
farmers. 
 
The competitiveness of French agriculture and domestic pressure on the government 
French agriculture at the time of the Uruguay Round had both import-competing sectors (such 
as livestock) and export-oriented sectors (cereals particularly) (Gyomarch et al. 1998). The 
export-oriented sector was highly competitive within the European internal market, which was 
insulated from the world market by its double pricing system and variable levies. Of all French 
agricultural exports, approximately 60% were traded within the EEC, and this percentage 
further increased during the 1980s (70% in 1987) (Delorme, 1994: 40-41). With respect to the 
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French competitive position on the world market, it was particularly due to European export 
restitutions that it was able to gain substantial market shares. Although French quality wine, 
cognac, champagne and cheese could be exported without or with only small export 
restitutions, such subsidies were indispensible for other agricultural products, particularly for 
cereals (Delorme, 1999: 41). The French competitive position within Europe and the world 
imply that it would be interested in the further liberalization of agricultural trade within the 
EEC, but not in liberalizing agricultural trade on a global scale. Farm organization in particular 
can be expected to oppose liberalization of agricultural trade in GATT. 
 The first proposal to start a new round of GATT negotiations was made in the early 
1980s. The United States, struggling with an increasing trade deficit, was particularly eager to 
bring agricultural trade under effective GATT discipline (Davis, 2003: 272). The Uruguay Round 
was launched in 1986 and it took until 1993 to reach an overall agreement. During this process, 
the negotiations bogged down several times, particularly due to disagreements on agriculture. 
 Until 1988, the degree of farm lobby mobilization with respect to the GATT negotiations 
was relatively limited. This can be explained by the fact that during the first half of the Uruguay 
Round, the negotiations focused on the modalities of an eventual agreement rather than on 
specific support reduction percentages. The farm lobby did not oppose the GATT negotiations, 
for they would rather negotiate than become part of a trade war. They did however urge for 
caution in the agricultural negotiations and claimed that France should take the lead in the EEC 
in order to arrive at reciprocal and balanced compromises (L’Information Agricole, May 1986). 
The only more specific demand advanced by the farm organizations was that the principles of 
the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) – which secured French agriculture important European 
market shares and through its export subsidies shares in the world market as well – should be 
guaranteed (L’Information Agricole, February 1986). Unsurprisingly, the farm lobby therefore 
welcomed the EEC proposal on agriculture that underlined that the principles of the CAP were 
non-negotiable, while it rejected the US ‘zero option’ that aimed at dismantling agricultural 
protection and putting the reductions in export subsidies on a fast-track (L’Information 
Agricole, October 1987; November 1987). 
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 Societal actors that could potentially lobby for more free-trade oriented practices – 
employer, trade and consumer organizations are the usual suspects in this respect – did not 
mobilize at all at this time. To the extent that political parties were involved, they merely 
reacted to governmental policies and equivocally supported them (Alons, 2010). 
 When the European Commission proposed to offer 30% reduction in agricultural 
support in the GATT negotiations, the French farm lobby furiously opposed this proposal. They 
argued it undermined the mechanisms and principles of the CAP, and was incompatible with 
French ideas on independence of food supplies and income from production as the main 
element of farm income (L’information Agricole, September 1990; October 1990; Le Monde  
25.10.1990). European agricultural policy should not be defined by states other than the EEC 
member states and the ideological pressure from the US should be resisted.1 They also opposed 
making concessions in exchange for ‘accompanying measures’ as they feared these would take 
the form of direct income support (replacing the existing double pricing system) which was 
incompatible with their view of agriculture as a primarily economic activity.2 The FNSEA instead 
preferred a system of market management at a global level, coordinating supply and 
production. The preferences of the political parties largely coincided with those of the farm 
lobby: both the communist party and the centre and right-wing parties opposed the proposal 
and urged the government to use its veto.3 Only the Socialist party (government party at the 
time) preferred demanding accompanying measures (La letter de la CNA. October 1990). 
 The European member states eventually accepted a watered down version of the 
Commission proposal, but this could not save the negotiations from collapsing – primarily over 
agriculture – in December 1990. GATT Secretary General Arthur Dunkel then tried to revive the 
negotiations in 1991 by proposing a Draft Final Act, in which he proposed reduction 
percentages of 35% on customs duties and export assistance. A crucial detail of the draft was 
that EC export restitutions were considered export assistance and were therefore subject to 
reduction, whereas the US deficiency payments (which had similar effects) were not. The 
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FNSEA argued that this proposal aimed at introducing a free market system into the agricultural 
sector, which they opposed (L’information Agricole, January 1992). They nevertheless hardly 
mobilized on the GATT issue, but were far more concerned about the negotiations on CAP 
reform that had commenced in the EEC in 1991. 
 Notwithstanding Dunkel’s efforts, the multilateral negotiations remained in the 
doldrums and the US and EEC started bilateral negotiations on agriculture. This resulted in the 
Blair House Accord in November 1992.4 The farm organizations were furious about this deal 
and they demanded that the government would use its veto against this American dictate, 
because it demanded even more concessions than the EEC had already made through the CAP-
reform of May 1992 and because it would undermine the multifunctionality of French 
agriculture (L’information Agricole, November 1992).5 All parties in parliament also urged for a 
French veto if the agreement was not adapted. Only the employers organization CNPF (Conseil 
National de Patronat Français) explicitly turned against such a veto, because this could 
jeopardize the negotiations on other issues in GATT. 
 When a centre-right government replaced the socialist government in March 1993, the 
farm lobby continued its efforts to demand renegotiation of the Blair House Accord or a French 
veto.6 Bilateral negotiations on the Accord were reopened in the autumn of 1993 and in 
December a Final GATT Accord could be reached covering the different negotiating areas of the 
Uruguay Round. The  farm lobby still was not very happy with its agricultural chapter but 
certainly considered it an improvement to the Blair House Accord. Of the political parties, only 
the communist party opposed ratification of the agreement.7 
 With respect to the positions taken by the farm lobby, we can see that their preference 
for continued protection reflects the overall competitive position of French agriculture. In 
addition, their preference for market management at the international level dovetails with their 
view of agriculture as an economic activity and the broader French penchant for market-
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intervention. Their arguments against too large a degree of liberalization were thus both 
economic and ideational in nature. 
 
National preference formation 
When a new round of GATT negotiations was first proposed in the early 1980s, France was not 
at all interested. It particularly resisted including agriculture in such negotiations, because this 
would force the EEC in a defensive position (Alons, 2010: 149). By the time that nearly all 
European member states had turned supportive of new GATT negotiations in 1985 and when it 
became clear that the US would never agree to such negotiations without including agriculture, 
France insisted that the mechanisms and principles of the CAP should not be negotiable and 
that the GATT-negotiations should include all forms of agricultural support and not only the 
export subsidies that the US were trying to target (Meunier, 2005: 105; Agra Europe, 
19.9.1986). France thus preferred not to negotiate on agricultural trade at all, but if this could 
not be prevented, the negotiations should not only entail European support practices but also 
those of other GATT partners. French rejection of the US zero-option should then come as no 
surprise, since this proposal brought CAP practices in the line of fire while keeping support that 
was not directly linked to production – which the US applied extensively – out of harm’s way. 
 In the governmental deliberations on the French position with regard to the 
Commission proposal to cut agricultural support by 30%, the positions of the different 
ministries diverged, although they all agreed that the proposal could not be accepted in its 
original form. While the ministry of agriculture preferred to reject the proposal altogether due 
to its negative effect on French agriculture, the other ministries, particularly the economics 
ministry and the prime minister’s office, did not want to put the entire proposal on the line as 
this would compromise the EEC’s position in GATT. The French aggregate preference became to 
limit the degree of protectionism and accept the proposal only after improvements had been 
made. Improvements were to be obtained by demanding research on the consequences of the 
proposal and proposing accompanying measures (despite farm lobby opposition).8 During the 
negotiations in the Council of Ministers, the French ministers involved were to prevent a vote 
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on the Commission proposal, but if this could not be averted, then the minister should vote 
against it.9 This is exactly what they did, arguing that the proposal in its original form would 
negatively impact the quality of life in the countryside and overall economic development. They 
claimed in addition that the proposal put too much faith in the proper functioning of the price-
mechanism without state intervention.10 Only after the Commission had made a number of 
concessions, did France accept the proposal. French farm organizations were not satisfied with 
this compromise (Alons, 2010). 
 In December 1991, the French ministers agreed that the Dunkel’s Draft Final Act did not 
serve French interests, but they disagreed on the position that France should defend in the 
Council of ministers. Again, the ministry of Agriculture was most reserved and wished to reject 
the proposal because it prejudiced the principle of community preference and failed to address 
American support measures. Although the other ministries had partly similar reservations, the 
Economics ministry was more worried about the bureaucracy required by the measures, while 
others feared the Franco-German axis could be undermined. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs was 
particularly anxious about damaging French prestige which would not be served by a full 
rejection of the Act. It was decided that France would oppose the Draft Final Act as a basis for 
negotiation.11 In defending this position, France argued that the proposal would dismantle the 
European system of support while the American system remained unaffected.12 Mitterrand 
allegedly commented during a cabinet meeting that ‘France is not ready to bow to American 
demands, or to submit itself to the interests of any other country, and it will not give in’ 
(Financial Times, 16.1.1992). 
 In the autumn of 1992, France tried to block the bilateral negotiations between the US 
and the EEC (Meunier, 2005: 109-110). During a conseil restreint convened by Mitterrand 
himself, it was decided that France would object to any agricultural deal that did not accord 
with the CAP reforms (Le Monde  19.11.1992). This implies that the degree of liberalization 
which the CAP reform provided, was now the French preference on the maximal outcome of 
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the GATT negotiations on agriculture. When the Blair House Accord was reached on 21 
November 1992, the French Prime Minister and Minister of Agriculture rejected the agreement 
immediately. The agreement was criticized for its assumed incompatibility with CAP reform and 
France’s vocation exportatrice (Alons, 2010: 258). France therefore demanded renegotiation in 
order to strike a better deal. Europe should negotiate on a equal footing with the US and should 
not allow the US to dictate European policy.13 The political pressure of the farmers were also an 
important consideration for the French government at this moment in time, because 
parliamentary elections were scheduled for March 1993, and the governing parties die not 
want to risk the wrath of the farmers who had earlier signaled their discontent with the CAP 
reform by massively voting against the Maastricht Treaty in the September 1992 referendum 
(Alons, 2010; see also Soisson, 1992). 
 In 1993, the new centre-right government continued these demands for renegotiation 
of the Blair House Accord. In September, it succeeded in convincing its European partners that 
the Accord should at least be ‘clarified’. The new agreement that was reached in December was 
presented by France as victory. The vocation exportatrice of European agriculture as well as 
community preference had been preserved, and the CAP was now recognized at the 
international level.14 
 
Conclusion 
Based on France’s state-dominated domestic structure, we expected that if the Left/Right 
hypothesis were to hold, it would be here; that farm lobby influence on the national preference 
defended in the international arena would be limited; and that ideational considerations would 
be important in the preference-formation process. I will discuss each in turn. 
 During the time of the Uruguay Round, a centre-right government was in office between 
1986 and 1988 and between March 1993 and December 1993, while a left government was in 
office between 1988 and march 1993. Were the centre-right governments more protective of 
French agriculture than the socialist government? This does not seem to be the case. Both tried 
to prevent too large a degree of liberalization in agriculture. 
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 The influence of the French farm lobby was indeed limited, with the exception of 1992, 
shortly prior to parliamentary elections. With respect to the 1990 Commission proposal, the 
government did not act according to the farmers’ wishes and in 1991, they defended French 
agriculture in the GATT negotiations absent considerable farm lobby pressure. It therefore does 
not seem to be that the French government was following the demands of societal actors. 
 Finally, both farm organizations and the government took account of France’s economic 
and ideational interests. Too large a degree of liberalization in the agricultural sector was 
rejected on the basis of considerations of the French export market, its vocation exportatrice, 
the French inclination for state-intervention and the wish to resist domination, particularly US-
domination. 
 
Germany and the liberalization of agricultural trade 
 
German identity and governmental paradigm 
The German state can generally be characterized as less interventionist than the French and far 
more disposed towards trade liberalization rather than protectionist policies. The agricultural 
sector is an exception to this rule however (Weiss, 1989: 79). In Germany’s interventionist 
agricultural policy, the Einkommensorientierten Productkpreispolitik (Führer, 1996: 22) is an 
important principle.  Price policy and income policy are closely connected and a combination of 
high guarantee prices and guaranteed sales quantities are meant to safeguard farm income 
(Hendriks, 1989).  A second principle in the German agricultural policy paradigm is that of the 
bäuerliche Landwirtschaft; small-scale family farming based on environmentally friendly and 
animal friendly production methods (Bulletin, 25.3.1987; Agrarbericht). Finally, as in France, the 
multifunctionality of agriculture is also important in Germany, stressing its environmental and 
social contributions (Bulletin, 19.3.1987; Agrarbericht). 
 Relevant aspects of the German state identity are the vision of itself as a ‘neue 
Handelsstaat’, and the Franco-German friendship. The ‘neue Handelsstaat’ is a state that ‘seine 
international Rolle nicht als ‘Polizist’(‘Sherrif’), sondern als ‘Kaufmann’ oder ‘Makler’ spielt und 
seine besondere Stärke nicht im militärischer Potenzsteigerung, sondern in ökonomischer 
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Leistungs- und Wettbewerbsfähigkeit findet’ (Rittberger, 1992: 223). Associated with this aspect 
of Germany’s identity is its prioritization of the international extension of free trade principles 
(Markovits and Reich, 1991: 59). Like France, Germany highly values the Franco-German 
friendship. Unlike France, the Germans have not striven for a leading political role in the 
formation of Europe (Markovits and Reich, 1991: 56) and have generally been prepared to 
‘defer […] to their French counterpart the political leadership of Europe’ (Cogan, 2003: 99). 
 The Deutscher Bauernverband (DBV), the main German farm organization, shared the 
governments ideas on an income-oriented product and price policy (Führer, 1996: 64) and also 
emphasized the bäuerliche Familienbetrieb as the preferred operation standard, enabling 
farmers to fulfill their multiple functions (economic, environmental social). Farmers further 
argued that the social functions the agricultural sector performed, legitimized a Sonderstelling 
for the sector, meaning that it should be subject to different policies than other economic 
sectors (no full exposure to market conditions) (Sontowski, 1990: 110-112). As in the French 
case, we can conclude that the governmental and agricultural interest group’s ideas on 
agricultural policy largely coincide. German trade and economic interest associations, however, 
pleaded for more market-oriented policies, also in the agricultural sector (Alons, 2010) 
 
The competitiveness of French agriculture and domestic pressure on the government 
From a comparative international perspective, the German agricultural sector did not have a 
strong competitive position in the 1980s and 1990s. This can partially be explained by the 
relatively high production costs of small-scale German farms (Statistical Yearbook, 1990: T82). 
Notwithstanding its poor competitiveness in an international perspective, Germany was able to 
export substantial amounts of agricultural products on the intra-EEC market thanks to the high 
guarantee prices of the CAP. Where reductions in these European guarantee prices would 
benefit French agriculture, they would harm Germany’s competitive position. Any agreement in 
GATT that would result in such price reductions, would thus lead to German market and income 
losses. The only circumstances under which liberalization of agricultural trade would serve the 
overall German economy, is if it were indispensible for obtaining liberalization in the industrial 
sector in GATT. For German industries were very competitive internationally across a wide 
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range of sectors, and the industrial sector as a whole provided a far larger contribution to the 
German GDP than did agriculture (Casper and Vitols, 1997: 2-3). 
 In German society, there was a large degree of agreement on taking part in a new round 
of GATT negotiations, including agriculture. Even the DBV did not explicitly reject this, although 
it warned that the CAP should not be put on the negotiating table (Deutsche 
Bauernkorrespondenz, November 1982; November 1986). Both the Bund Deutscher Industrie 
(BDI) and the Bundesverband des Gross- und Aussenhandels (BGA) specifically argued that 
agriculture should be put under stricter trade discipline (Handelsblatt, 5.11.1986), not in the 
least because trade conflicts in agriculture threatened to damage German industrial exports.15 
All the major parties in parliament (CDU/CSU, SPD, FDP) also supported German participation in 
a new trade round, including agriculture. The CDU/CSU emphasized that the bäuerliche 
Landwirtschaft should be left untouched, but that policies needed to be developed to curb 
surplus production. The SPD preferred more extensive reforms.16 
 Once the negotiations got started, mobilization, both from the part of agricultural and 
industrial groups, was very limited initially. The industrial groups did not become actively 
involved in the agricultural negotiations until the second half of the Uruguay Round. The DBV 
was more concerned about Commission price proposals and reform proposals in relation to the 
CAP. They did however link these Commission activities to the GATT negotiations when they 
warned not to use these negotiations as a pretext to undermine European agricultural 
arrangements (Deutsche Bauern Korrespondenz, December 1988). 
 In 1990, the DBV rejected the Commission proposal of 30% reduction in agricultural 
support as it was selling out on the notion of the bäuerliche Landwirtschaft and sacrificed 
agriculture for the trade interests of German industry (Die Welt, 8.10.1990). They also argued 
that multifunctionality and community preference were at stake (Deutsche Bauern 
Korrespondenz, November 1990). German industry wanted to conclude the Uruguay Round as 
soon as possible, if necessary by making concessions in the area of agriculture. The political 
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parties were divided. The FDP welcomed the Commission proposal and even encouraged the 
Commission to take a more liberal stance on agricultural trade (Agra Europe 7.12.1990; Die 
Welt, 8.10.1990), whereas the CDU/CSU was anxious about the potential consequences of the 
proposal for farm income and community preference.17 Although the government was facing 
contradictory domestic pressure, the political circumstances were such that it would be very 
difficult for them to ignore the mobilization of the German farming community. For the first all-
German general elections after reunification were scheduled for 2 December, and the CDU/CSU 
was dependent on the agricultural vote (Hendriks, 1991; Petit et al, 1987). 
 When Dunkel presented the Draft Final Act in December 1991, the DBV rejected this 
compromise, arguing that the EEC should not give up its right to decide on an autonomous 
agricultural policy for the sake of an international free trade ideology. The Act would 
undermine the EEC system of market regulation and would force an end to the income-
oriented price policy in exchange for an individual-support policy, downgrading farmers to a 
‘Socialhilfestatus’ (Deutsche Bauern Korrespondenz, January 1992). Nevertheless there was 
agreement among the parties in parliament that the government should step up its efforts to 
achieve a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round on the basis of the Dunkel Draft. The SPD 
even accused the government of taking insufficient action to reach this goal and argued the 
government thus damaged German export interests.18 Although the mobilization of industrial 
and trade lobbies was not as pronounced as that of the DBV (Davis, 2003: 296-297), they kept 
reiterating their argument that concessions should be made on agriculture in order to arrive at 
advantageous deals in other negotiating areas (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 5.3.1991). 
 In 1992, the balance of domestic pressure tended more and more in favour of trade 
liberalization. Proponents of free trade intensified their pressure and blamed the agricultural 
sector for the deadlock in the trade talks. The BDI, BGA, as well as the FDP leadership argued 
that the German government should take more vigorous action to secure a GATT deal (Die 
Welt, 10.11.1992). When the Commission and the United States reached the Blair House 
Agreement, the DBV opposed the deal as it negatively affected farm income, community 
preference and the multifunctionality of German agriculture (Deutsche Bauern Korrespondenz, 
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April 1992). They also began to portray the GATT issue as a choice between good relations with 
France or giving in to the demands of the United States. The DBV argued that the former was 
far more important than trans-Atlantic cooperation (Deutsche Bauern Korrespondenz, 
November 1992; Handelsblatt, 11.11.1992). However, the farm lobby stood alone in its 
mobilization against the agreement, which was welcomed by coalition parties and opposition 
parties alike, as well as by the industrial and trade lobbies (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 24.11.1992).19 
 In 1993, the balance of preferences within German society still favoured compromises 
on agriculture to ensure a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round. BDI and FDP warned the 
government to prioritize trade interests over French agricultural interests (Handelsblatt, 
18.2.1993) and not to sacrifice German interests for the German-French friendship 
(Handelsblatt, 10.3.1993). They therefore demanded that the government resist the French 
demands for renegotiation of the Blair House Accord (Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, 
10.7.1993). All parliamentary parties also defended the view that reopening the agricultural 
negotiations would jeopardize the chances of success for the Uruguay Round as a whole 
(Handelsblatt, 10.9.1993; 13.9.1993). Only the DBV supported the French demand for 
renegotiations (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 11.9.1993). The final GATT deal that was reached in 
December 1993 was widely welcomed in Germany, and again, only the DBV remained critical 
(Deutsche Bauern Korrespondenz,  January 1994). 
 The constant farm lobby preference against liberalization of agricultural trade reflects 
the overall competitive position of German agriculture, and the arguments they used to defend 
their position were clearly based both on the economic consequences of liberalization for the 
agricultural sector, and on ideational considerations concerning the bäuerliche Landwirtschaft, 
the Produktpreispolitik and the multifunctionality of German agriculture. The industrial and 
trade lobby preference for liberalization reflects both their competitive position and their 
conviction that market-policies should be extended to all economic sectors. 
 
National preference formation 
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When the issue of a new round of GATT negotiations was tabled, Germany considered 
favouring this proposal was a natural position to take given its economic export interests and 
the role that Germany had long played as a fundamental advocate of free trade (e.g. speech of 
Kohl in Bulletin, 14.10.1982). Despite some opposition from the Ministry of Agriculture at first, 
Germany soon explicitly supported including agriculture in the negotiations as well, because 
subjecting this sector to greater GATT discipline would mitigate potential agricultural trade 
conflicts – particularly between the EEC and the US – which could easily spill over to industrial 
sectors.20 Nevertheless, considering the initial French reservations, the importance Germany 
attached to the Franco-German friendship led it to steer a middle course between arguing hard 
for a new GATT round and going about very carefully in order not to upset the French. German 
diplomacy therefore focused on ‘Frankreich bewusst machen, dass seinen Interessen langfristig 
am besten durch eine weltoffene Handelspolitik gedient ist’.21 The German preference for new 
trade negotiations, including agriculture, but also with France on board, were thus based both 
on its economic export interests and the ideas on its proper role (Handelsstaat, friend of 
France) in the international system. 
 Despite Germany’s overall supportive position for trade liberalization, it soon became 
one of the main obstacles in the agricultural negotiations. Although the German Ministry of 
Economics preferred concessions on agriculture (but not acceptance of the US zero-option) 
(Handelsblatt, 15.12.1988; BMWI Tagesnachrichten 27.1.1989), the Ministry of Agriculture hit 
the brakes (Alons, 2010: 208). These internal differences within the German government also 
surfaced with respect to the Commission proposal in 1990. The Ministry of Agriculture 
immediately rejected the proposal due to the economic and social consequences for German 
agriculture (Frankfurter Rundschau, 9.10.1990; Agra Europe, 12.10.1990) , whereas the Ministry 
of Economics emphasized the German need for a successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round 
and therefore wanted to accept the proposal without amendments Süddeutsche Zeitung, 
9.10.1990). The latter considered the Commission proposal the appropriate means of 
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enhancing the likelihood of a successful GATT deal (BMWI Tagesnachrichten, 17.10.1990). The 
German government, and Chancellor Kohl in particular, found itself in an awkward position, 
because its aims of preventing trouble with the farming community (particularly so shortly prior 
to the parliamentary elections) and avoiding stalemate in the UR were not commensurable. In a 
coalition meeting under the leadership of Kohl the position was reached that Germany would 
emphasize the successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round but would not accept the 
Commission proposal before accompanying measures were promised and community 
preference was guaranteed (Agra Europe, 19.10.1990). While lip-service was thus paid to the 
importance of a GATT deal (although the sincerity of that aim should not be doubted), Germany 
actually preferred protecting agriculture at this point. Both officials involved in these 
negotiations and press reports convincingly argue that considerations of farm lobby opposition 
explain the preference for agricultural protection despite the risk this entailed for the successful 
conclusion of the Uruguay Round (interview Feiter, 21.5.2007; Agra Europe, 26.10.1990; 
Financial Times, 29.11.1990). Once Germany had received the concessions it demanded from 
the Commission, it still was not prepared to accept the proposal at first, because France still 
opposed it (Agra Europe, 2.11.1990; Frankfurter Rundschau, 30.10.1990). Documents of the 
Staatssekretär Ausschuss für Europafragen, however, show that the government soon decided 
not to prioritize the franco-german friendship over everything and was eventually prepared to 
outvote France in the Council if necessary.22 
 In 1991, reflective of the mobilization of societal groups discussed earlier, increasing 
numbers of government members started to argue that it was most important to reach a 
successful conclusion of the Uruguay Round and that concessions had to be made on 
agriculture in order to reach this goal (Alons, 2010: 300). A cabinet meeting on the Leitlinien for 
GATT and CAP reform effectuated a shift in the balance of German priorities, away from 
protecting agricultural interests and towards securing a GATT deal. Despite opposition of the 
Minister of Agriculture, the Minister of Economics was now allowed to defend the German 
position that the Commission should increase its efforts to reach a GATT deal by the end of 
1991 and that it should soften its position on agriculture to secure this aim (Vahl, 1997: 160; Die 
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Welt, 14.10.1991; Financial Times, 14.10.1990). In accordance with this decision, Germany 
welcomed Dunkel’s Draft Final Act as a basis for further negotiations and tried to convince the 
other European member states to do the same (Alons, 2010: 302). In 1992, the Minister of 
Economics also tried to put more pressure on the French government and asked Kohl to do the 
same (New York Times, 22.2.1992). Kohl however stated that he was not ready to apply 
pressure to another member of the European Community, arguing that ‘[a]nybody who knows 
French politics should know that would be a fatal thing to do’ (Financial Times, 24.3.1992). 
When the Blair House agreement was reached the German government immediately accepted 
it and regarded it a good basis for progress in the Uruguay Round (Bulletin, 20.11.1992). Even 
the Minister of Agriculture had advised against rejecting the accord, arguing that, considering 
the German and French opposed interests in agriculture, the government had to ask itself how 
far solidarity with France should be taken on this issue (Süddeutsche Zeitung, 30.11.1992). 
 Due to the intensive pressure from the new French government in 1993 to support their 
demands of renegotiation of the Blair House accord, the German priority of concluding the 
Uruguay Round swiftly in view of its export interests, once more collided with its wish to 
preserve the Franco-German friendship. While all ministers involved agreed that Germany 
should not give in to these demands (BMWI Tagesnachrichten, 21.6.1993; Handelsblatt, 
31.8.1993), Kohl stated at a press conference after a meeting with Mitterrand that Germany 
also had problems with the Blair House accord. Officials in the negotiating process agree that 
Kohl’s statement can only be satisfactorily explained by his wish to do something for the 
French, on the basis of the value he attached to the Franco-German friendship and his personal 
relations with Mitterrand (interview Legras, 12.11.2007; interview Feiter, 21.5.2001; interview 
Schomerus, 29.3.2007; interview Ludewig, 5.4.2007; interview Schlöder and Witt, 4.8.2008). 
Although Kohl’s statement did not indicate a real change in preferences – the Franco-German 
friendship may have increased in importance for Kohl, but it certainly did not supersede his 
preference for as swift as possible a conclusion of the Uruguay Round – it did stir up intra-
governmental divisions again on whether or not to start consultations with the French on their 
demand of renegotiations (Alons, 2010: 307). With the aim of seeking a solution that would 
make things easier for the French without endangering the successful conclusion of the 
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Uruguay Round (interview Schomerus, 29.3.2007), Germany,  during a Council meeting in 
September, agreed to seeking ‘clarification’ of the Blair House accord. When the final deal was 
subsequently struck in December 1993, Germany immediately accepted it.  
 
Conclusion 
Based on Germany’s society-dominated domestic structure, I expected that the Left/Right 
hypothesis was less likely to hold here than in the German case; that the German national 
preference was likely to reflect the preferences of societal actors; and that ideational 
considerations would be less decisive in than in the French case, unless the relevant ideas were 
shared by government and societal actors to a large degree. 
 On the first variable of Left/Right government, the German case does not offer 
variation, since a centre-right government was in office during the entire Uruguay Round. What 
is striking though is that the centre-right government, though favouring liberalization in many 
economic sectors, favoured protectionism in the agricultural sector. Ideational variables related 
to the Sonderstelling of agriculture were important in this respect. The socialist party, although 
not in government (and we should leave open the possibility that actually being in government 
makes a difference), did not defend the commonly assumed left-wing position of protectionism 
in the agricultural sector. Both the French and the German case therefore provide no evidence 
for the Left/Right hypothesis. 
 The preferences defended as national preference by the German government, to a large 
extent indeed reflect the balance of preferences in society. Societal actors overwhelmingly 
supported new GATT negotiations. The specific influence of the farm lobby is particularly 
pronounced in 1990. Their dominance at the time is only partially explained by their greater 
degree of mobilization relative to societal actors who held opposing views, however, because 
the upcoming elections made the CDU/CSU extremely sensitive to the farm vote that tends to 
provide grassroots support for these parties in particular in Germany. The positions defended 
by Germany from 1991 onwards largely reflect the preferences of the majority of societal 
actors, again. 
32 
 
 Ideational considerations did not appear to be much less important in Germany than in 
France. Considerations of the multifunctionality of the bäuerliche Landwirtschaft, Germany’s 
role as a Handelsstaat and the Franco-German friendhip, proved to be important in the 
formation of the national preference. That these ideas mattered may partially be explained by 
the fact that they were shared in large segments of German society, but another possible 
conclusion is that the expectations based on domestic structure systematically underestimates 
the role of ideational variables in states with a society-dominated structure. 
 
Comparing the French and German cases also allows for a tentative evaluation of the 
North/South hypothesis. Although Germany was overall more free-trade oriented than France, 
it did not yield pride of place to France when it comes to protection of the agricultural sector. 
While the North/South dimension may therefore explain overall patterns in trade preferences 
across Europe, it does not explain the German trade preferences in the agricultural sector.  
 
France and the liberalization of trade in services 
Unfortunately I have not been able to conclude my research on the services case before the 
deadline for this paper. I appear to be wanting too much in one paper anyway ;-) so I have to 
think about how I could better make my point in a single paper in as concise a fashion as 
possible. 
 
France and the liberalization of trade in services 
 
 
Conclusion 
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